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FOCUSED DISCUSSION INVITED PAPER
Equipment for an Experiment∗
Rom Harré†
Science is as much defined by the local “instrumentarium,” the
equipment available to an experimenter at a particular time and
place, as by its discoveries and theories. Instruments are devices
for detecting and measuring natural phenomena, linked causally
to those aspects of nature they are used to record. Some are
inorganic, made of glass and metal, while others are organic, the
bodies and body parts of living or once living plants and animals. In
contrast, pieces of apparatus are quite different in the ways in which
they work. They too can be organic or inorganic, but their role is to
model things, process, structures, and so on in the natural world.
They are used to study natural processes by simulating them in
a user-friendly way. Keeping the distinction between instruments
and apparatus in mind is crucial to understanding the power of the
experimental method.
We do not know at what moment human beings moved from simply
observing the phenomena of nature to actively intervening to increase
the store of reliable knowledge–or even if there was such a moment.
Equipment is the meeting point between the active experimenter and
the potent stuff of the universe. Typically, if one opened the door of a
laboratory–for example, like the one in the well-known illustration of the
famous room at the Royal Institution where Michael Faraday worked–there
would be many things made from glass and metal, wrought into shapes
just right for their purposes. At the same time, the bodies of animals and
plants, their parts and secretions, were also being pressed into service for
sincere purposes. Robert Boyle not only studied the behaviour of gases
in glass u-tubes, but also the role of the blood in experimenting on dogs.
However, since record-keeping came into practice, there has been plenty
of evidence of the use of equipment for all sorts of knowledge-gaining
purposes. As philosophers and historians, contemplating the activities of
scientists, we ask what those purposes are and how they are achieved.
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Let us call the equipment available at some time and place to an
experimenter the instrumentarium. Faraday’s lab, like the school science
laboratories of our youth, was filled with inorganic equipment: glass
test tubes, a coil of wire, and a magnet, all suitably arranged. An
important part of the instrumentarium is and has always been organic,
equipment constructed from living materials or materials that were once
alive. Spiders, dogs, and chimps were used to test the extraterrestrial
environment in the space program. Harry Harlow used live infant monkeys
in his experiments on mothering (Harlow 1971). Lichens have been used
to measure the age of rocks. Organic indicators, such as litmus paper, are
used to detect the presence of acids and alkalis in solutions.
To get a clear picture of the nature and uses of scientific equipment we
need to explore the basic distinction between instruments and apparatus.
Instruments are related causally to the natural world as detectors of natural
phenomena such as litmus solution, which reveals whether a solution
is acidic, or thermometers, with which we measure temperature. Some
natural phenomenon causes an effect in the instrument, and this effect
is the source of an item of scientific knowledge. An apparatus, however,
stands in a different relation to the world we are using it to study. From
a logical point of view, a piece of equipment, such as a Wheatstone
bridge or a flask and gas jar, is a model of some part of the natural world
created by abstraction and used to represent some aspect of that world.
Causal processes are internal to the apparatus whereas a model is related
conceptually to the world. A calorimeter filled with salty water represents
the Arctic ocean by mimicking one small segment of it. It is not causally
related to that ocean, as the thermometer of an explorer would be.
The distinction between instruments and apparatus is a crucial one for
the philosopher or historian looking into the methods of science. These
terms are not quite so sharply distinguished in customary usage as I
will use them here, yet they roughly delineate a central distinction in the
equipment we draw from the instrumentarium. Let us now turn to examine
the uses of each of these categories of knowledge-garnering equipment
in more detail.
Instruments
Instruments and natural phenomena are related causally. The state
of something being used as an instrument can be affected by the state
of something in the world. There are detectors, such as litmus paper
sensitive to the presence of acids and alkalis, changing from red to blue in
relation to the pH of the solution; transgenic fish that react to the presence
of pollutants in the water, fluorescing in response to the presence of
contaminants; and so on. There are also all sorts of measuring devices
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for ascertaining the relative quantities of material things, such as rulers,
clocks, balances, and ammeters. For example, thermometers change their
state in an orderly manner in response to changes in the temperature of
their surroundings by the expansion of the fluids enclosed in the body of
the instrument. Some of these instruments are organic or derived from
biological sources. For example, the relative sizes of the diameters of discs
of lichens have been used to measure the age of glacier moraines.
Changes in the state of the system to be measured must stand in
some orderly relationship to observable changes brought about in the
measuring device. The displacement of the needle in an ammeter, for
example, must be proportional to the amount of current in the circuit in
which it is incorporated. The numbers and sequence of different species
of fossil midges in the sediment on the floors of lakes can be used to
determine past temperatures of those lakes since the temperature at a
given time causes one species of gnat to predominate.
Instruments both as detectors and as measurers are thus related
causally to the world.
Apparatus
The world presents itself to an enquirer in a myriad of complex forms.
An important part of scientific research is to abstract one process–say a
chemical reaction–from complex clusters of processes in nature. Then, in
relative isolation and in strictly controlled conditions, this process can be
studied without the interference of external causal influences. In a physics
laboratory one might find a simple copper vessel containing a mixture of
ice, salt, and water: a basic calorimeter. It can be used to reproduce the
cooling of salt water below the temperature at which pure water freezes.
This happens in the sea in the Arctic winter, though for how long this will
go on in nature we do not know thanks to global warming. The conditions
of the winter climate at either pole are much more complex than what
we can represent with a calorimeter. In the actual sea there are currents
and landmasses exerting their particular influences on the formation of
the winter ice that floats on the surface of the sea. The calorimeter
provides knowledge of one part of the process of the freezing of salt water
because of an analogy between the water in the calorimeter and in the
ocean. The scientific value of experiments with the calorimeter depends
on the balance of differences and similarities between the apparatus and
the real-world phenomenon it represents. When designing apparatus, the
balance of similarities and differences is crucial.
The chemists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were adept
at constructing pieces of apparatus for isolating physical and chemical
processes from the complex natural environments in which they occurred.
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Lavoisier set up an apparatus that abstracted the role of atmospheric
gases from all the other conditions involved in combustion (Lavoisier
1783). He isolated the process by which a metal was reduced to ash, and
then followed the reactions by which the metal was eventually recovered.
The value of this research as a source of knowledge of the calcination of
metals and the processes involved in smelting ores depended on the fact
that Lavoisier had abstracted the core processes of burning and smelting
and reproduced them in his laboratory.
The relation between apparatus and world is conceptual. We reason
from what happens in the laboratory to how things might be in nature.
In building an apparatus to represent a natural process we reason in
the reverse direction, again following the pattern of analogy, balancing
similarities and differences from reality to analogue. If something happens
in a certain way in the laboratory as we run an experiment in a
well-designed piece of apparatus, it is likely to happen thus and so in the
world which the apparatus represents, all else being equal! Experimenting
with apparatus contributes to our scientific knowledge because we believe
that it reproduces an instance of a natural regularity that exists in the real
world, embedded in a cluster of other processes from which it must be
abstracted. In the total pattern of analogy that is expressed in the concrete
construction of the apparatus, it is the similarity dimension that supports
the extraction of an item of knowledge from the behaviour of the apparatus.
However, the reproduction of natural processes can go further than
isolating just one aspect of a complex reality. An important part of
advanced laboratory work is the construction of working models of the
processes of nature in a conveniently simplified form. In order to study
the process of the formation of rainbows, Theodoric of Freiberg set up
racks of rows of spherical flasks filled with water (Wallace 1951). Each
flask represented a raindrop, and the whole rack was a representation of
the curtain of falling rain. Setting a lamp in the same relative position to
the rack as the Sun would have been to the water drops in a real rain
shower, he was able to produce a working model of a complex natural
phenomenon in his laboratory. Here he could do something that would be
impossible to do in nature–study the paths taken by rays of light of different
colours through the water in flask as a model or analogue of a raindrop.
Theodoric drew his conclusions about the way rainbows were generated
by reasoning through analogy. The behaviour of the light in the flasks was
not caused by a real rainbow–it simulated one.
Theodoric constructed an apparatus of glass and water. It was an
inorganic creation. Sometimes an apparatus is largely made up of
organic materials, including living things. To study the relation between
infant welfare and mothering practices, Harry Harlow built an apparatus
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R. Harré Equipment for an Experiment
that simulated this relation using monkeys as analogues of human
beings (Harlow 1971). However, the logical structure of this experimental
apparatus was more complex: he wanted to isolate specific aspects of
mothering and to do so he constructed analogues of monkey mothers.
The apparatus consisted of a wire frame with a teat, which represented
just one mothering behaviour–providing nutrition. A cloth-covered frame
abstracted another aspect of monkey mothering–providing comfort. Was
suckling more significant than comfort in the lives of infant monkeys?
These abstract analogues enabled him to investigate the question without
the interference of all sorts of other aspects of nurturance.
Apparatus is related conceptually to the world it helps us to understand.
SOME WORKING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE USE OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT
Instruments
To infer something about an object of interest from the state of pieces
of equipment in use for measuring or for detecting invisible and intangible
things, substances, and processes–in a laboratory or elsewhere–the
scientist must believe that there has been a causal interaction between
the world and the instrument, as I have argued. Generally it is assumed
that the instrument is in a way detached from or outside of the world it is
being used to study. So an important underlying assumption of the use of
instruments for detecting or measuring an attribute of an inhabitant of the
natural world is that the equipment is affected by but does not affect that
which it samples, or least not much. Sometimes this assumption does not
hold well and allowances for reciprocal effects must be made. Sometimes
the thermometer requires so much heat to expand the mercury that the
liquid being studied cools down substantially. Sometimes the experimental
procedure kills the animal at the core of the apparatus, as when Pavlov
snipped the vagus nerve of one of his dogs to demonstrate nervous control
of pancreatic secretions (Pavlov 1897). Skilled experimenters know how to
compensate for these exceptions. For example, usually the pressure in the
car tires is not significantly reduced by the amount of air needed to activate
the tire gauge. Ideally instruments are designed to minimize reciprocal
causal reactions. The readings of instruments depend on causal relations
that link states of the world to observable states of the instrument for their
scientific value, which are essentially one-way, world to instrument.
Apparatus
Using a piece of laboratory equipment as a model for some natural
process is related conceptually rather than causally to the rest of the
material world, as I have emphasized. Of course an apparatus is part of
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that world. A map of the world is an object in the world, just as an authentic
model village contains a model of itself. Again, there is an isolation
assumption involved. The model world contains as much of the real world
as it needs to evolve its own forms of natural processes. Although it is
set aside from the world, it represents whatever happens in the model
as authentic to the target. For example, Clarke’s famous study (Clarke
1955) of the effects of overcrowding on reproduction rates followed the
changes in the endocrine glands of voles in model populations; from his
observations, Clarke drew conclusions about population biology of all sorts
of other mammals, including human beings. The model worlds were set up
so as to exclude extraneous factors, such as predators and meteorological
vagaries. Sometimes the “isolation” assumption is rudely disturbed, as
when the vibrations of the early morning trams in Cleveland, Ohio, upset
the equipment Michelson and Morley were using to measure the speed of
light in different directions. Only rarely does the isolation assumption need
to be dealt with explicitly. For the most part, an apparatus as a model can
be used as if it were detached from or outside the material world, as if it
were a truly isolated system.
Models or analogue representations of aspects of the world under
study are extremely common in the sciences. An analogue can be
analyzed in terms of likenesses and differences to that which it is
analogous to. In the sciences, model-building is usually based on a
process that is already well understood and used to illuminate something
that is not. The former is the source of the model; the latter, its subject.
Darwin used the breeding of pigeons and farm animals as the source of
his model of speciation, the process he imagined had led to the diversity
of species, calling it natural selection. The idea of “selection,” modeled
on breeding practices, the farmer’s selection of desirable features in the
animals to breed from next season, was an untried analogue of what
might be the natural process truly responsible for the variation within and
among species. That mysterious process was the subject that Darwin’s
model was intended to represent (Darwin 1859). This idea of the trio
“Source-Model-Subject” proves very useful when we analyze the role of
particular pieces of apparatus and assess the quality of their contributions
to knowledge.
Some equipment can be thought of as constructed to model a process,
structure, or system so that we can understand it via a simplified and
manageable material setup. It often happens that the subject of the model
cannot easily be manipulated or experimented on, but the model that
represents it can be. For example, a culture of a particular bacterium
thought to be responsible for an infectious disease can be grown on
agar in a Petri dish. An infusion of a possible antibiotic is introduced
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and we watch for an effect on the bacteria of the culture. This is an in
vitro version or model of a phenomenon that we have reason to believe
occurs in vivo, when an antibiotic is given to a patient with a certain kind
of infection. An apparatus such as the simple Petri dish, a model of an
infected human being, represents only some aspects of a complex reality,
the infective agent and the antibiotic. This kind of modeling–creating a
simplified version of a real-world complexity–is a very common scientific
technique. We saw its use in calorimetric studies of the density of water
around its freezing point. The knowledge-producing power of an apparatus
is dependent on a subtle balance between abstraction and verisimilitude.
Of course, the balance can only be struck on a case-by-case basis–there
are no universal rules for determining the fruitfulness of models.
Studying domesticated versions of natural things, systems, and
processes supports quite strong inferences to the way things are in the
wild, since the same kind of material systems and phenomena occur
in the wild and in domestication. The metaphor of domestic versus feral
versions of things and processes applies equally to inorganic and organic
processes. The feral targets are, of course, instances of natural kinds, and
so, the designer of an apparatus hopes, are the beings activated in the
equipment. The art of the experimenter is to select and modify feral beings
to create a powerful model of a natural system. Domesticated animals are
still animals and can be used to model the genetics of their feral cousins!
An apparatus, as a model, however much it is simplified and tidied up as a
version of its source, is a piece of nature in the laboratory. Of course, the
richness and authority of inferences from model to subject will depend
on how relations of similarity and difference between apparatus made
by technicians and real-world systems are weighted by the interests of
the researcher in performing the experimental manipulations. These are
the premises of reasoning by analogy. Since anything can in principle
be analogous to anything else, the art of analogical reasoning requires a
certain skill and discretion. Modeling is a scientific technique that requires
a good deal of intuition and insight to be really effective. Nevertheless,
it is the most powerful tool in the instrumentarium available to the
experimenter.
Sometimes the modeling analogy leads to hypotheses about what
might have happened, or what could be happening, in processes that
cannot be observed directly with any experimental apparatus or detector
from the current instrumentarium. Creating mixtures of methane and water
vapour and passing electric discharges through them in a closed globe
has been used to try to simulate possible conditions of the Earth’s early
atmosphere.
In reflecting on the analogical power of a piece of apparatus we must
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ask whether it is simply behavioural similarities between the apparatus
and its subject that matter (what we could call the behavioural analogy)
or whether we are ready to go further and infer something about
the process, hitherto unobserved, that brings about that behaviour–the
material analogy at the heart of a model. The ingenious selection of one of
the Galapagos islands as a model world to study natural selection allowed
Rosemary and Peter Grant of Princetown University in the nineteen
seventies to investigate, by analogy, the processes that were in principle
unobservable, that had brought about the changes in the forms of plants
and animals over millions of generations. The Grants observed, firsthand,
the effects of environmental privation and sexual selection that Darwin had
only imagined (Weiner 1995).
THE CONTENTS OF THE INSTRUMENTARIUM
Looked at in this way, scientific equipment includes four main classes of
devices. There are instruments for detecting the presence of something in
the environment, such as levels of carbon monoxide. There are measuring
instruments, for determining the quantitative values of properties of their
targets, such as the movement of a coil in an electric field as an indicator
of “electrical pressure.” There are pieces of apparatus with which natural
processes can be studied in isolation, such as Mendel’s garden plots
where he worked out the algebraic law of hybridized attributes of peas by
studying a few attributes among the many that plants exhibit. Lastly, there
are pieces of apparatus that serve as models representing very complex
processes and situations in nature in ways that can be more convenient
than studying those complexities in the natural world itself. Such apparatus
can even created as computer programs, such as the models that are used
to predict weather patterns.
Each laboratory has its characteristic instrumentarium, the actual
equipment available to an experimenter. Depending on the generosity
of the laboratory’s budget, the instrumentarium will consist not only of
what is in the storeroom, but also what is to be found for purchase in
the catalogues of instrument makers. In the great days of experimental
science, in the time of Michael Faraday, for example, the laboratory was
not only a place where instruments and pieces of apparatus were used,
but also where instruments and apparatus were made. Science has always
found a place for living beings in the instrumentarium as well as equipment
made of inorganic materials. For example, in Pavlov’s laboratory the
instrumentarium was almost exclusively populated by dogs.
The distinction between instrument and apparatus is fundamental to
understanding the experimental method. Equipment that is activated by
causal relations with states of nature is fundamentally different in its
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ontological status from that in which causal processes in nature are
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